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To	 date,	 feminist	 interventions	 aimed	 at	 shaping	 the	 field	 and	 scope	 of	
transitional	justice	have	concentrated	on	widening	the	range	of	harms	visible	in	the	
process	of	societal	transformation.	To	this	end,	activating	international	accountability	
and	deepening	domestic	criminalization	of	sexual	violence	in	times	of	conflict	and	
societal repression was an early priority.1	In	a	similar	vein,	the	feminist	agenda	has	
also	prioritized	exploring	 the	 relationship	of	gender	 to	 truth-telling,	 to	amnesty,	
and	 to	 peacemaking.	 More	 recently,	 efforts	 to	 engender	 reparations	 programs	
have	brought	light	and	heat	to	a	range	of	harms	experienced	by	women	that	were	
typically	ignored	in	prior	programs,	including	loss	of	the	capacity	to	bear	children	
or	the	costs	of	bearing	children	born	of	sexual	violation.2 There have been efforts to 
bring	a	range	of	non-physical	harms,	such	as	familial	separation	or	forced	nudity,	
within the universe of harms captured by transitional justice.3	Increasing	feminist	
attention	 to	 the	 category	 of	 socioeconomic	 harms	 and	 their	 disproportionate	
impact on women is also a feature of contemporary analysis.4	Feminist	critique	
has	consistently	 focused	on	 the	 tendency	of	 legal	categories	 to	“privatize”	such	
harms—to	regard	them	as	apolitical	and	unrelated	to	the	acts	of	mass	(political)	
violence	for	which	transitional	justice	measures	seek	accountability—thus	leaving	
a	broad	range	of	harms	that	are	disproportionately	experienced	by	women	outside	
the	purview	of	transitional	justice.	The	identification	of	gender	patterns	in	terms	
of which harms are visible to transitional justice and which are left untouched has 
been	one	of	the	central	feminist	contributions	to	the	field.	
By	contrast,	feminist	interventions	have	assumed	a	remarkably	narrow	set	
of actors and institutions of responsibility. Many devices common to the transi-
tional	justice	landscape—amnesty,	truth-recovery,	international	criminal	justice,	
1 See Kelly dawn asKIn, war CrImes aGaInst women proseCutIon In InternatIonal war CrImes 
(1997);	Françoise	Krill,	The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law,	249	Int’l 
reV. red Cross 337	(1985).
2	 Ruth	 Rubio-Marin,	 The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies,	 in the Gender of 
reparatIons: unsettlInG sexual hIerarChIes whIle redressInG human rIGhts VIolatIons 
63	 (Ruth	Rubio-Marin	ed.,	2009);	see also	Colleen	Duggan,	Claudia	Paz	y	Paz	Bailey	&	Julie	
Guillerot,	Reparations for Sexual and Reproductive Violence: Prospects for Achieving Gender 
Justice in Guatemala and Peru,	2	Int’l J. transItIonal Just. 192,	200-01	(2008).
3	 Fionnuala	Ní	Aoláin,	Sex-Based Violence and the Holocaust: A Reevaluation of Harms and Rights 
in International Law,	12	yale J.l. & femInIsm	43	(2000).
4	 Christine	Chinkin,	The	Protection	of	Economic,	Social,	and	Cultural	Rights	Post-Conflict,	Paper	
for	the	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	on	Human	Rights’	Women’s	Human	Rights	and	Gender	
Unit	(2008),	available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women.
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reconstruction,	 rule-of-law	 reform,	 security-sector	 reform,	 and	 reparations—
posit	the	state	as	the	site	and	conduit	of	transition.	In	this	typology,	transitional	
justice	is	a	process	by	which	the	state	is	rendered	coherent	and	legitimate.	Femi-
nist	interventions	in	the	field	of	transitional	justice	have	tended	to	assume	the	
state; the state is seen as the locus for reform and the entity that is most capable 
of	 and	 necessary	 to	 delivering	 transformation	 for	women.	 Examples	 of	 such	
interventions	include	advocacy	for	tougher	measures	of	individual	criminal	ac-
countability	for	sexual	violence,	gender	analysis	in	truth	commissions,	policy	
prescriptions	for	reparations	programs,	and	advocacy	for	prioritizing	an	end	to	
gender	harms	in	security-sector	reform.	We	suggest	that	many	of	these	interven-
tions assume a functional state as the sine qua non for successful transition as 
measured by and for women. 
We	posit	that	this	singular	focus	on	the	state	can	obscure	a	range	of	other	
important	actors	relevant	to	securing	transition	and	may	overestimate	the	extent	to	
which	the	state	is	capable	of	delivering	on	feminist	expectations.	In	the	Colombian	
case	and	multiple	other	contexts,	a	state-centric	focus	of	transitional	justice	fails	
to	engage	with	the	practical	reality	that	the	state	may	be	fractured	and	divided	and	
that	non-state	entities	play	as	much	of	a	role	in	ending	and	supporting	conflict	as	
does	the	state.	In	many	contexts,	including	the	Colombian,	non-state	actors	may	
have	“effective	control”	of	territory,	may	exercise	quasi/state-like	functions,	are	
recognized	as	having	de	facto	autonomy,	and	are	brought	into	peace	negotiations	
and	 conflict-ending	 processes	 on	 that	 basis.	 The	 imposition	 of	 legal	 norms	 in	
such	 situations	may	 depend	 on	 an	 inconsistent	 or	 downgraded	matrix	 of	 state	
enforcement in competition or in parallel with appropriation of law or force norms 
by	 the	 non-state	 actor	 in	 their	 spheres	 of	 influence.	So,	 prior	 to	 any	 transition	
one	should	not	presume	that	the	state	has	been	capable	of	enforcing	law	in	any	
meaningful	way	throughout	its	sovereign	territory—quite	the	opposite	may	in	fact	
be	the	case.	We	suggest	that	the	quality	and	extent	of	state	capacity	to	enforce	legal	
norms	prior	to	a	transition	and	the	degree	and	scope	of	control	exercised	by	non-
state	actors	are	important	underlying	dimensions	that	underpin	the	difficulties	in	
securing	legal	accountability	in	transitional	contexts	in	general,	and	for	women	in	
particular.	Specifically,	in	this	chapter	we	assert	that	greater	attention	needs	to	be	
paid	to	securing	and	enforcing	accountability	mechanisms	for	gendered	violations	
committed by non-state actors.
This	 chapter	 interrogates	 the	 framework	 provided	 by	 international	 law5 
for	 addressing	 the	 gendered	 violence	 of	 non-state	 actors	 and	 is	 intended	 as	
a constructive intervention for feminist efforts to enhance accountability for 
violence	against	women.	In	order	to	make	the	groundbreaking	legal	developments	
of	the	past	two	decades	more	meaningful	for	situations	of	ongoing	violence	we	
5	 Our	focus	therefore	is	on	the	nature	of	the	Colombian	State’s	international	legal	commitments	as	
opposed	to	the	domestic	criminalization	of	international	law.
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must	pay	greater	attention	to	the	limits	of	the	state’s	reach	and	consider	innovative	
solutions	to	better	capture	harms	by	non-state	actors.	To	this	end,	we	draw	on	the	
paradigmatic	case	of	Colombia	to	illustrate	the	gaps	in	accountability	that	emerge	
with	respect	to	violence	against	women	and	the	non-state	actor	in	armed	conflict.	
Part	 I	 will	 offer	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	 the	 gendered	 gaps	 of	 negotiated	
transition with non-state actors and present the Colombian case as exemplary. 
In	Part	 II	we	consider	 the	general	 regime	of	accountability	under	 international	
humanitarian law and focus on how commitments to minimum humanitarian 
standards	 might	 bring	 greater	 accountability	 measures	 for	 ongoing	 acts	 of	
violence	against	women	perpetrated	by	guerrilla	groups	when	the	application	of	
international	humanitarian	law	is	contested.	Part	III	then	deals	with	imputed	state	
liability for the violence of non-state actors. We focus on the persistent violence of 
the	non-state	groups	in	internal	armed	conflict	situations—particularly	violence	
experienced	disproportionately	by	women—and	identify	the	attendant	complexity	
of	 holding	 such	 groups	 and	 individuals	 accountable	 during	 transition.	 This	
section	concludes	by	examining	how	the	horizontal	application	of	human	rights	
obligations	can	be	more	effectively	exploited	 to	 secure	 state	accountability	 for	
multiple	forms	of	violence	against	women	within	demilitarization	zones.
 
I.  Gendered Dimensions of Negotiated Transition 
For a more considered appreciation of the capacity and limitations of the 
state,	it	is	important	to	focus	on	one	foundational	aspect	of	the	liberal	(democratic)	
state,	 and	 a	 vision	 that	 undergirds	 the	 “from”	 and	 “to”	 of	 many	 transitional	
contexts—namely	 the	 public/private	 distinction.	 The	 delineation	 of	 public	 and	
private	harms	in	transitional	justice	discourse	draws	on	a	long	genealogy	of	public	
and	private	spheres	in	liberal	political	discourse	and	is	critical	to	the	structuring	
of political transformation. This distinction has had important implications for 
the	types	of	harms	retrospectively	identified	in	transitional	justice	accounting.	In	
contexts	where	transitional	 justice	is	 instituted	in	 the	midst	of	ongoing	conflict,	
gendered	distinctions	around	public	and	private	harms	are	embedded	in	the	political	
compromise that underpins transitional justice. The political compromise then 
shapes	the	legal	and	political	arrangements	that	become	embedded	and	normalized	
in	steady-state	transitional	justice,	as	the	state	moves	towards	its	“new”	normal.
Transition	is	defined	as	a	movement	away	from	violence	and	toward	(liberal)	
democratic	statehood.	However,	 the	violence	to	be	ended	falls	within	a	narrow	
range	of	public	harms	and	transition	is	usually	premised	on	the	ending	of	public	
communal	 violence	 between	 (generally)	 male	 combatants.6	 Paradigmatically	
6 See CynthIa CoCKburn, the spaCe between us: neGotIatInG Gender and natIonal IdentItIes In 
ConflICt	(2003).
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transitions	have	frequently	been	premised	on	the	deal	that	is	struck	between	the	
state	and	non-state	actor(s).	Peace	deals	and	political	compromises	that	precede	
transitional	justice	processes	inevitably	identify	and	privilege	a	particular	set	of	
actors,	 across	both	 the	 state	 and	non-state	 spectrum.	The	 exigencies	of	 ending	
violence	often	mean	that	the	first	test	of	peace	negotiations	will	be	the	effectiveness	
of	the	process	in	getting	the	violent	actors	around	a	table	and,	secondly,	party	to	
an	agreement.	The	very	outsiders	that	were	deeply	involved	in	violent	activities	
are	 rewarded	 by	 remaking	 the	 state	 and	 its	 structures	 in	ways	 that	 bring	 non-
state	actors,	whose	support	is	deemed	indispensable	and	must	therefore	be	earned,	
into the mainstream. The violence of course invariably involves harms directed 
towards	women.	Hence,	the	“deal”	is	often	a	deal	for	boys	and	not	for	girls,	as	a	
matter both of substance and representation. 
These	 two	 realities—the	 gendered	 categorization	 of	 public/private	 harms	
and	the	enduring	influence	of	the	non-state	actor	in	transition—combine	to	create	
a particularly precarious security situation for women in contexts of limited or 
fractured state capacity. While the peace deal may transform relations between 
violent	 (generally	male)	 actors,	 it	will	 likely	 do	 very	 little	 to	 transform	 social	
relations	within	zones	geographically	and	politically	controlled	by	violent	non-
state	actors.	Further,	 the	political	 compromise	at	 the	heart	of	 the	peace	deal	 is	
based on a clear hierarchy of public over private harms. 
Such	observations	suggest	a	need	to	interrogate	the	composition,	capacity,	
and	accountability	of	the	state	in	transition.	Given	the	enduring	influence	of	the	
non-state	 actor,	 re-establishing	 the	 state’s	monopoly	 on	 coercion	 is	 secured	 in	
practice	by	bringing	the	non-state	actor	within	 the	state.	The	boundaries	of	 the	
state	 are	 therefore	 negotiated	 and	negotiable.	The	 state’s	malleable	 boundaries	
create	accountability	gaps	as	a	matter	of	principle	and	practice	 in	 international	
law,	which	 chiefly	posits	 the	 state	 as	 the	 site	 and	conduit	 of	 accountability.	 In	
general,	across	the	two	most	relevant	international	legal	frameworks	in	transitional	
settings—human	 rights	 law	 and	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 (IHL)7—there	
is	a	regulatory	gap	or	at	 least	a	slimmer	body	of	norms	that	apply	to	non-state	
actors	 than	 to	 state	actors.	 In	most	 functional	 societies,	 this	accountability	gap	
between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 non-state	 actor,	 while	 not	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 general	
efficiency	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (and	 with	 substantial	 consequences	 for	 women),	
does	not	 create	 a	massive	 lacuna	 in	 legal	 regulation.	The	 same	cannot	be	 said	
of	 transitional	 societies.	 In	 these	 societies,	 precisely	 because	 the	 local	 rule	 of	
law	may	be	compromised	or	degraded	and	enforcement	of	“ordinary”	rules	may	
be	 limited,	 international	 legal	norms	are	 frequently	called	upon	 to	fill	 the	gap.	
7	 We	note	that	as	Colombia	ratified	the	Rome	Statute	in	2002,	though	exercising	its	discretion	under	
article	124	of	the	Statute	to	postpone	for	seven	years	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	over	war	crimes	
committed within the country. Consideration by the ICC may offer a substantive future route for 
violence	against	women	to	be	considered.
119
Equally,	the	role	and	influence	of	the	non-state	actor	(particularly	with	respect	to	
the	infliction	of	force)	will	be	markedly	higher.	Thus	the	presence,	centrality,	and	
lack	of	capture	of	the	actions	of	the	non-state	actor	are	enormously	significant,	
and in our view under-appreciated. 
The	Colombian	case	is	paradigmatic	of	such	dilemmas	and	gaps.	Six	decades	
of	multi-actor	 and	multi-causal	 violence	 in	Colombia	 set	 the	 backdrop	 to	 the	
contemporary	process	of	transitional	justice	in	the	country.	Multiple	competing	
actors	with	both	military	capacity	and	political	power,	operating	in	parallel	or	in	
opposition	to	the	State,	have	undermined	any	claim	by	the	State	to	the	monopoly	
on	coercion.	Strong	regional	variations	in	the	country,	in	terms	of	wealth,	ethnic	
profile,	state	presence,	and	conflict	density	 further	erode	Colombian	claims	 to	
statehood.	In	addition,	state	institutions	are	marked	by	high	levels	of	corruption	
and	low	levels	of	popular	confidence.	Conflict	violence	has	reinforced	popular	
alienation from the State. The multiplicity of violent state and non-state actors 
poses	 particular	 challenges	 to	 securing	 accountability	 for	 violence	 against	
women,	a	form	of	violence	that	has	traditionally	eluded	accountability	even	in	
settled states. 
Colombia is also exemplary of the forms and limitations of scrutiny rendered 
by	the	international	legal	regime	applicable	to	the	domain	of	transitional	justice.	
Colombia	is	party	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	and	Protocol	II	as	well	of	nearly	all	
core	human	rights’	treaties.	Regional	human	rights	bodies	frequently	adjudicate	on	
the	applicability	of	human	rights	norms	to	the	country	and	to	the	conflict.	Colombia	
is therefore exemplary of the scrutiny rendered by the applicable international 
legal	regimes	relevant	to	the	domain	of	transitional	justice.	The	“capture”	of	these	
legal	norms	cut	across	the	state/non-state	distinction.	The	nature	of	the	Colombian	
conflict	and	the	state’s	international	legal	commitments	make	the	Colombian	case	
particularly	relevant	to	assessing	and	addressing	the	sorts	of	accountability	issues	
that	emerge	in	a	context	of	transition	in	which	the	armed	non-state	actor(s)	has	an	
enduring	presence.
Below	 we	 discuss	 expanding	 and	 capitalizing	 on	 humanitarian	 law’s	
capture	 of	 the	 non-state	 actor,	 the	 first	 of	 our	 two	 suggested	 areas	 for	
improvement.
II.  Humanitarian Law Accountability and Minimum Humanitarian 
Standards: Capturing the Harms of the Non-state Actor 
The	following	section	(A)	describes	the	nature	of	international	humanitarian	
law’s	(IHL)	treatment	of	non-state	actors	committing	gender	harms	and	identifies	
current	gaps	in	accountability.	The	second	part	of	this	analysis	(B)	presents	three	
possible	targets	for	feminist	intervention.	
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 A. Diagnosis of the Gaps and Current State of IHL
The	panorama	outlined	below	reveals	a	myriad	of	harms	committed	against	
women	by	non-state	actors	in	conflict	situations.	Although	there	is	some	foundation	
in	IHL	for	capturing	the	harms	committed	by	non-state	actors	and	gendered	harms,	
there	are	important	gaps	in	the	framework	and	norms.	Additionally,	both	states	
and	non-state	actors	demonstrate	a	reluctance	to	accept,	or	in	practice	a	low	level	
of	commitment	to,	IHL	standards.	We	will	address	each	problem	in	turn.
1.		Harms	Suffered	by	Women	in	Conflict
It	 is	 generally	understood	 that	 the	 experience	of	 and	 fall-out	 from	violent	
conflict	 is	 particularly	 extreme	 for	many	women.8	There	 are	 numerous	 conflict	
harms	 that	 are	 suffered	 disproportionately	 or	 exclusively	 by	women,	 including	
forced	 displacement,	 penetrative	 sexual	 violence,	 sexual	 mutilation,	 forced	
pregnancy,	sexually	 transmitted	diseases,	sexual	dysfunction,	and	 loss	of	status,	
social	ostracism,	or	cultural	punishment	as	a	result	of	a	perceived	loss	of	purity.	
Despite	a	broad	swathe	of	research	on	the	effects	of	conflict	violence	generally,9 
we	have	little	good	data	on	the	attribution	of	responsibility	for	gender-based	harms	
as	between	state	and	non-state	forces	in	general,	and	even	less	information	in	the	
context	of	specific	internal	conflicts.	We	also	have	limited	empirical	data	on	whether	
different	patterns	of	transgression	manifest	for	women	depending	on	whether	it	is	a	
state	or	a	non-state	actor	perpetrating	the	violence	in	question.	Nonetheless,	a	broad	
sweep	 of	 journalistic,	 non-governmental,	 and	 anecdotal	 evidence	 confirms	 that	
women	increasingly	experience	traumatic	and	widespread	violations	perpetrated	
by	non-state	actors	across	a	wide	variety	of	conflict	types	and	locations.10 
Particular	characteristics	of	the	Colombian	conflict	have	created	an	acute	cri-
sis	within	the	civilian	population,	specifically	for	women	and	girls.11	Conflict	in	the	
country	rarely	involves	direct	confrontation	between	the	different	armed	groups;	
rather	 these	armed	groups	settle	 their	 scores	by	attacking	civilians	suspected	of	
supporting	the	other	side.	Although	men	are	the	most	common	victims	of	summary	
8 See generally the aftermath: women In post-ConflICt transformatIon	 (Sheila	 Meintjes,	
Meredeth	Turshen	&	Anu	Pillay	eds.,	2002).
9 See, e.g.,	women In an InseCure world: VIolenCe aGaInst women faCts, fIGures and analysIs 
(Marie	Vlachova	&	Lea	Biason	eds.,	2005).
10	 Secretary-General,	Report of the Secretary-General on Advancement of Women: In-depth study 
on All Forms of Violence against Women,	U.N.	Doc.	A/61/122/Add.1	(6	July	2006);	Elizabeth	Rehn	
&	Ellen	Johnson	Sirleaf,	UNIFEM,	Progress	of	the	World’s	Women	Series,	Vol.	1,	Women, War, 
Peace: The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and 
Women’s Role in Peace Building	(2002).
11	 UN	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 Violence	 against	Women	 Radhika	 Coomaraswamy,	Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Submitted in 
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/49,	 Addendum:	 Mission	 to	
Colombia	(1-7	Nov.	2001),	U.N.	Doc.	E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.3	(Mar.	11,	2002).	
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executions	and	massacres,	violence	against	women,	particularly	sexual	violence	
by	armed	groups,	has	become	a	common	practice	within	the	context	of	a	slowly	
degrading	conflict	and	a	lack	of	respect	for	international	humanitarian	law.12 
Abduction	of	women,	detention	in	conditions	of	sexual	slavery,	and	forced	
domestic	labor,	are	characteristic	of	the	treatment	of	women	by	paramilitary	forces.13 
Survivors	explain	how	paramilitaries	arrive	in	a	village,	completely	control	and	
terrorize	the	population,	and	commit	human	rights	abuses	with	total	impunity.14 
Guerilla	groups	have	carried	out	kidnappings,	 indiscriminate	attacks	that	affect	
the	civilian	population,	and	arbitrary	and	deliberate	killings	of	those	they	accuse	
of	siding	with	their	enemies.	They	are	the	principal	perpetrators	of	abduction	and	
forced	recruitment	of	children,	infringement	of	women’s	reproductive	rights,	and	
kidnapping	for	extortion	purposes.15	Many	female	combatants	in	both	guerilla	and	
paramilitary	 forces	suffer	 sexual	abuse	and	 infringements	of	 their	 reproductive	
rights.	Forced	contraception,	sterilization,	and	abortion	are	particularly	associated	
with	guerilla	groups.16 
Both	 groups	 are	 responsible	 for	 forcible	 displacement	 of	 civilian	
communities.	 Colombia	 has	 the	 largest	 internally	 displaced	 population	 in	 the	
western	hemisphere,	currently	estimated	at	over	3.5	million	people.	The	majority	
of	 the	displaced	 are	 female.	These	women	and	girls	 are	 subjected	 to	manifold	
forms	of	violence.	Internally	displaced	women	are	at	much	greater	risk	of	sexual	
abuse,	rape,	and	being	forced	into	prostitution	because	of	their	particular	social	
and economic vulnerability.17 
2.		Humanitarian	 Law’s	 Treatment	 of	 the	Non-State	Actor	 and	Gender	
Harms
In	contrast	to	this	myriad	of	violent	harms	perpetrated	against	Colombian	
women	by	non-state	actors,	 there	 is	 a	bias	 to	 the	accountability	dimensions	of	
the	international	legal	system	whose	norms	and	mechanism	do	not	“catch”	these	
harms.	This	is	not	a	new	observation,	nor	is	 it	surprising.	With	its	Westphalian	
roots,	the	international	system	was	structured	around	the	centrality	of	states	and	
state	 actors	 with	 evident	 seepage	 to	 accountability.	 International	 legal	 norms,	
specifically	 in	 the	field	of	human	rights,	give	a	clear	 treaty	basis	on	which	 the	
contracting	state	can	be	held	accountable	for	a	wide	variety	of	violations	related	
12 Id.	at	2.
13 Id.	at	12.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 14.
16 amnesty InternatIonal, broKen bodIes, shattered mInds: torture and Ill-treatment of 
women	27-28	(2001).	For	example,	Amnesty	International	reports	that,	out	of	a	group	of	65	girls	
who	had	left	the	guerrillas,	all	had	had	intrauterine	devices	inserted,	some	against	their	will	and	
without	being	given	information	about	the	device.	Id.
17 Id.	at	29.
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to	 human	 dignity.18	 International	 humanitarian	 law	 also	 gives	 a	 clear	 basis	 for	
the	enforcement	of	humanitarian	norms	through	the	grave	breaches	system,	but	
it	is	broadly	aimed	at	States	Parties	to	the	treaties.19	As	a	result,	mechanisms	of	
accountability	were	primarily	designed	to	capture	the	actions	of	state	actors	con-
sistent with a traditional vertical notion of state responsibility under international 
law.20	With	the	emergence	of	the	non-state	actor	as	a	particular	threat,	most	nota-
bly	in	the	areas	of	terrorism,	this	gap	is	of	increasing	concern.	
The	Geneva	Conventions	of	1949	were	primarily	focused	on	the	protection	
of civilians and hors de combat,	viewing	the	state	as	the	primary	source	of	threat	
to	 the	 safety	 and	 integrity	 of	 such	 vulnerable	 groups.21	 By	 1979,	 through	 the	
Additional	Protocols	to	the	Geneva	Conventions,	States	agreed	that	certain	non-
state	 groups,	 specifically	 national	 liberation	movements	 and	 similarly	 situated	
organizations	could	be	included	within	the	ambit	of	regulation	by	the	laws	of	war.22 
However,	these	included	groupings	were	essentially	quasi/state-like	or,	operating	
in	contexts	(colonial	or	occupation)	in	which	it	was	generally	accepted	that	political	
shifts	would	herald	a	change	in	power	to	governments	led	by	those	same	non-state	
groupings.	Protocol	 II	Additional	 to	 the	Geneva	Conventions	of	1979	expands	
the	accountability	orbit	by	regulating	a	wider	range	of	internal	conflicts,	but	on	
more limited terms.23	As	a	 result	humanitarian	 law	has	 the	capacity	 to	directly	
18	 International	Covenant	on	Civil	 and	Political	Rights,	Dec.	19,	1966,	999	U.N.T.S.	171,	entered 
into force	Mar.	23,	1976;	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	213	U.N.T.S.	222,	entered into 
force	Sept.	3,	1953; American	Convention	on	Human	Rights,	Nov.	22,	1969,	1144	U.N.T.S.	143,	
entered into force	July	18,	1978);	African	Charter	on	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights,	1520	U.N.T.S.	
217,	entered into force	Oct.	21,	1986.
19 See Oren	Gross,	The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia,	16	
mICh. J. Int’l l. 783	(1995).
20 See J. l. brIerly, the law of natIons	49-56	(6th	ed.,	1978).
21 frItz KahlshoVen & lIesbeth zeGVeld, ICrC, ConstraInts on the waGInG of war: an 
IntroduCtIon to InternatIonal humanItarIan law (2001),	available at	http://www.icrc.org/web/
eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0793.
22	 Protocol	1	Article	1	on	 the	General	principles	and	 scope	of	application	 refers	 to	 those	“armed	
conflicts	 in	 which	 peoples	 are	 fighting	 against	 colonial	 domination	 and	 alien	 occupation	 and	
against	 racist	 regimes	 in	 the	 exercise	of	 their	 right	of	 self-determination.”	Protocol	Additional	
to	the	Geneva	Conventions	of	12	August	1949,	and	Relating	to	the	Protection	of	Victims	of	Non-
International	Armed	Conflicts	(Protocol	II),	1125	U.N.T.S.	609,	entered into force	Dec.	7,	1978.
23	 Protocol	II	Article	1(1)	states	that	the	Protocol	applies	to	
all	armed	conflicts	which	are	not	covered	by	Article	1	of	[Protocol	I]	and	which	
take	place	in	the	territory	of	a	High	Contracting	Party	between	its	armed	forces	
and	 dissident	 armed	 forces	 or	 other	 organized	 armed	 groups	 which,	 under	
responsible	 command,	 exercise	 such	 control	 over	 a	 part	 of	 its	 territory	 as	 to	
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement	this	Protocol.	
Article	 1(2)	 notes	 that	 the	 Protocol	 “shall	 not	 apply	 to	 situations	 of	 internal	
disturbances	and	tensions,	such	as	riots,	isolated	and	sporadic	acts	of	violence	
and	other	acts	of	a	similar	nature,	as	not	being	armed	conflicts.”
	 Protocol	Additional	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	of	12	August	1949,	and	Relating	to	the	Protection	
of	Victims	of	Non-International	Armed	Conflicts	(Protocol	II),	1125	U.N.T.S.	609,	entered into 
force	Dec.	7,	1978.
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and indirectly hold some non-state actors to account. This is facilitated by the 
capacity	of	judicial	bodies	to	utilize	the	threshold,	organization,	and	membership	
criteria	of	humanitarian	law,	most	often	in	tandem	with	the	application	of	human	
rights	norms	to	the	actions	of	non-state	actors	that	reach	the	legal	threshold	for	the	
application	of	Protocol	II.24 
If	humanitarian	law	were	accepted	as	applicable	by	all	parties	in	a	conflict,	
there	might	be	some	general	agreement	between	states	and	non-state	actors	on	
the	norms	that	cannot	be	violated	and	mechanisms	in	play	that	would,	in	theory,	
address accountability.25	This	would	 create	 an	 agreed	 ethical	 and	 legal	 context	
in	which	breaches	would	be	understood	as	legal	violations	potentially	subject	to	
sanction.	As	The Roots of Behaviour in War, an	authoritative	ICRC	study,	affirms,	
a	core	element	of	preventing	violations	of	 the	laws	of	war	 is	 to	focus	more	on	
legal	norms	rather	than	on	underlying	values.26	So,	a	starting	point	for	prevention	
and	redress	is	advancing	common	agreement	between	combatants,	whether	state	
or	non-state,	on	the	applicability	of	agreed	legal	rules.	
We	endorse	 the	principle	 that	creating	greater	 leverage	requiring	states	 to	
affirm	the	applicability	of	IHL	is	a	sensible	and	important	mechanism	to	this	end.	
In	 tandem	we	 also	 support	 greater	 efforts	 to	 encourage	non-state	 groupings	 to	
adhere	 to	 the	norms	of	 the	Geneva	Conventions	(Common	Article	3),	Protocol	
I	and	Protocol	II	when	the	conflicts	fall	within	their	legal	thresholds.	Significant	
buy-in	by	states,	non-state	groups,	and	international	organizations	of	influence	to	
utilize	and	reference	these	norms	would	be	progress	for	the	protection	of	civilians	
generally,	and	women	specifically.	
Despite	some	provisions,	existing	norms	are	not	fully	adequate	to	confront	
women’s	 experiences	 of	 harm	 in	 internal	 conflict.	 In	 general,	 IHL’s	 historical	
neglect	of	harms	experienced	by	women	points	to	deep	and	gendered	biases	in	the	
construction of the law of war.27	More	recently,	there	has	been	significant	norm	
augmentation.28	However,	the	roots	of	such	additions	have	been	problematically	
24	 ICTY,	Prosecutor	v.	Tadic,	Case	No	.	IT-97-	1-A,	Judgment	172-237	(July	15,	1999)	(including	inter	
alia	an	analysis	of	the	status	of	conflict	finding	that	the	Common	Article	3	was	applicable	to	the	
conflict	taking	place	in	the	Former	Yugoslavia	at	the	time	of	the	violations	in	question).
25	 This	 speculation	 is	 largely	 theoretical	 in	 that	 few	 situations	 of	 internal	 armed	 conflict	 have	
applied	such	norms	and	little	or	no	accountability	has	been	sought	in	terms	of	either	domestic	or	
international	legal	process.
26 ICrC, the roots of behaVIour In war: understandInG and preVentInG Ihl VIolatIons	(2004).
27 See	Judith	Gardham,	Women and Armed Conflict: The Response of International Humanitarian 
Law,	 in lIstenInG to sIlenCes: women and armed ConflICt	 109-25	 (Helen	Durham	&	Tracey	
Gurd	eds.,	2005).	
28 See	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	Prosecution	of	Persons	Responsible	for	
Serious	Violations	of	International	Humanitarian	Law	Committed	in	the	Territory	of	the	Former	
Yugoslavia	since	1991,	U.N.	Doc	S/25704,	at	36	(May	3,	1993);	Statute	of	the	International	Tribunal	
for	the	Prosecution	of	Persons	Responsible	for	Serious	Violations	of	International	Humanitarian	
Law	Committed	in	the	Territory	of	Rwanda,	U.N.	Doc.	S/RES/955	(Nov.	6,	1994).
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linked	to	the	ongoing	connection	made	between	women’s	purity	and	honor.29	As	a	
result,	the	capture	of	violations	(mostly	sexual)	exclude	or	ignore	many	gendered	
harms	that	women	themselves	might	articulate	as	equally	or	more	harmful.	
Although	IHL	envisages	a	relatively	broad	range	of	actors	being	“caught”	
under	 its	 rubric,	 enforcement	 provisions	 are	 less	 encompassing.	Additionally,	
substantial	political	and	legal	obstacles	exist	to	the	willingness	of	states	and	non-
state	actors	to	acknowledge	the	applicability	of	IHL	norms	and	in	practice	buy-in	
to	the	standards.	Below,	we	consider	obstacles	to	the	application	of	IHL	generally	
and	in	the	specific	context	of	Colombia.	
3.		State	Resistance	to	the	Application	of	IHL	and	Consequences	for	Women
States	have	long	resisted	the	application	of	international	humanitarian	law	
norms	 to	 the	 regulation	of	ongoing	 internal	armed	conflicts.30	States	have	 long	
felt	 threatened	by	granting	combatant	status	to	persons	who	they	feel	are	more	
appropriately	categorized	as	criminals	or	terrorists.	This	has	meant	that	attempts	
to	expand	humanitarian	law’s	ambit	to	encompass	non-state	groupings	has	been	
met	by	a	measure	of	ongoing	hostility	by	states.	Despite	this,	we	suggest	that	there	
is	room	for	improvement	in	compliance	with	existing	norms.
These	dynamics	apply	directly	 to	 the	Colombian	context,	where	 the	 state	
has	 long-resisted	 the	 application	 of	 IHL.	 Given	 that	 the	 historic	 roots	 of	 the	
conflict31	precede	the	negotiation	of	the	Geneva	Conventions,	and	more	relevantly	
perhaps	 the	Additional	Protocols,	 the	 regulatory	 capacity	of	 IHL	has	had	 little	
to	 say	about	 (and/or	has	not	deployed	 to	address)	 the	historic	 roots	of	 conflict	
and to the methods and means of warfare deployed within it. In parallel with the 
practice	of	other	states,	Colombia	has	generally	sought	to	eschew	the	application	
of	humanitarian	law,	presumably	on	the	basis	that	it	would	limit	the	scope	of	the	
State	to	treat	insurgents	and	non-state	actors	as	criminals	under	the	ordinary	legal	
29	 The	 1977	Diplomatic	Conference	 expanding	 the	 protections	 of	 the	 laws	 of	war	 to	 enumerated	
internal	conflicts	evidenced	preoccupation	with	the	fertile	and	expectant	woman.	The	Conference	
acknowledged	 that	 women	 had	 to	 be	 given	 “special	 protection”	 because	 of	 their	 “special	
situation”—including	 “pregnant	 women,	 maternity	 cases	 and	 women	 who	 were	 in	 charge	 of	
children	of	less	than	seven	years	of	age	or	who	accompanied	them.”	The	only	notable	movement	
in	the	article	concerned	with	“measures	in	favor	of	women	and	children”	was	the	inclusion	of	the	
phrase	“special	respect”	for	women	rather	than	the	term	“honor.”	Also,	under	Article	75	of	the	
Protocol	I	rape	is	 included	under	the	general	heading	of	being	a	crime	against	“dignity”	rather	
than	 a	 crime	 against	 “honor.”	 This	 article	 also	 recognized	 the	 particular	 experience	 of	 forced	
prostitution	by	specifically	including	its	prohibition.	The	Diplomatic	Conference	gave	little	of	its	
attention to the physical violence experienced by women in war. 
30	 Examples	include:	Britain	in	relation	to	Northern	Ireland;	Mexico	in	relation	to	the	Chiapas	region;	
Russia	in	relation	to	Chechnya;	and	Turkey	in	relation	to	the	North-East	of	Turkey,	where	a	large	
Kurdish	population	is	located.
31	 The	origins	of	the	contemporary	conflict	are	typically	located	in	the	civil	war	(La Violencia) of 
1948	to	1964.
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system.	Despite	the	persistence	of	the	conflict,	and	the	intersection	of	emergency	
law	and	humanitarian	law	norms	in	the	same	period,	the	conflict	has	been	largely	
immune	to	the	influence	and	regulation	of	IHL.
Presidential	 peace	 initiatives	 in	 the	 early	 1990s	 led	 to	 the	 ratification	 of	
Protocol	II	to	the	Geneva	Conventions	in	1995	as	part	of	a	larger	scheme	to	recognize	
and	address	 the	political	grievances	of	 the	guerrilla	 insurgents.	 In	practice,	 the	
State’s	commitment	to	the	application	of	Protocol	II	to	the	guerrilla	groups	has	
waxed	and	waned,	in	accordance	with	the	faltering	progress	of	successive	peace	
initiatives.	The	Uribe	 administration	 insists	 that	 the	 conflict	 does	not	meet	 the	
threshold	of	violence	required	to	engage	Protocol	II32 (which is consistent with the 
practice	of	other	states	faced	with	internal	insurgencies	and/or	non-state	collective	
violence).	Nonetheless,	it	is	helpful	that	the	treaty	framework	includes	Protocol	
II.	Recognition	 leaves	 space	 for	 interaction	 through	 the	 discourse	 provided	by	
IHL	norms	on	accountability	and	provides	a	normative	frame	of	reference	for	the	
violations committed.
In	 terms	 of	 sex-based	 violence,	 the	 potential	 applicability	 of	 Protocol	 II	
is	 important.	Protocol	II	 includes	in	its	provision	of	Fundamental	Guarantees	a	
prohibition	 on	 rape.	Relevant	 also	 is	 that	 in	December	 1992,	 the	 International	
Committee	 for	 the	 Red	 Cross,	 declared	 that	 the	 provisions	 of	Article	 147	 on	
grave	breaches	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	included	rape.33	This	gives	some	point	
of	 regulatory	 entry	 to	 address	 the	 sexual	 violations	 experienced	 by	women	 in	
Colombia	through	the	legal	prism	of	Protocol	II.
However,	 state	 reluctance	 to	 concede	 the	 application	 of	 IHL	means	 that	
a	 criminalization	model	 is	 frequently	 applied	 (albeit	with	great	 tension)	 to	 the	
actions	of	 the	non-state	actor.	Such	a	model	generally	struggles	 to	be	effective	
given	 ongoing	 competition	 over	 territory,	 legitimacy,	 and	 control	 of	 political	
space.	A	criminalization	model	generally	fails	to	create	any	political	acceptance	
or	accommodation	of	the	genuine	issues	of	political	and	territorial	dispute	that	are	
at the heart of communal violence. 
Moreover,	in	the	Colombian	case,	the	relative	impotence	of	the	criminal	justice	
system	in	the	face	of	endemic	levels	of	violence	against	women	is	reflected	in	the	
staggering	levels	of	impunity.34	Even	with	the	diminution	in	the	levels	of	conflict	
violence	in	recent	years,	the	criminal	justice	system	has	struggled	to	establish	that	
it	is	fit-for-purpose	for	the	prevention,	investigation,	prosecution,	and	punishment	
of	 violence	 against	women.	 Local	women’s	 organizations	 continue	 to	 identify	
manifold	and	systemic	shortcomings	in	the	criminal	justice	system,	ranging	from	
attitudinal	problems	of	staff	who	fail	to	acknowledge	violence	against	women	as	
32 See generally	Mikro	Sossai,	The Internal Conflict in Colombia and the Fight Against Terrorism: 
UN Security Council Resolution 1465 (2003) and Further Developments,	3	J. Int’l CrIm. Just. 
253	(2005).
33	 International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross,	Aide-mémoire on Provision of Article 147	(Dec.	1992).
34 See generally	Special	Rapporteur:	Mission	to	Colombia,	supra note 11. 
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a	serious	social	harm,	and	technical	issues	around	the	prosecutors’	treatment	and	
use of evidence of sexual violence.35 Even if the criminal system were capable 
of	 addressing	 cases	 of	 violence	 against	women	 efficiently,	 individual	 cases	 in	
ordinary jurisdiction would not necessarily serve to expose the systematic and 
structural	 characteristics	 of	 crimes	 against	 women	 committed	 as	 part	 of	 the	
conflict.	Criminalization	in	this	perspective	functions	to	blur	rather	than	highlight	
the	need	to	address	the	causes	of	conflict	by	political	negotiation.	
Guerrilla	groups	have	on	several	occasions	acknowledged	 the	application	
of	IHL	to	the	Colombian	conflict.	In	1995,	the	Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
(ELN)	 declared	 that	 it	 considered	 itself	 to	 be	 bound	 by	 the	 1949	 Geneva	
Conventions	and	Additional	Protocol	II,36 around the same time that the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-EP)	made	a	similar	commitment.37 
This	acknowledgement	reflects	a	pattern	by	some	established	national	liberation	
movements	to	unilaterally	affirm	that	they	are	bound	by	the	minimum	standards	
of	the	Geneva	Conventions.	Both	the	African	National	Congress	and	the	Palestine	
Liberation	 Organization	 have	made	 such	 declarations	 in	 the	 past.38 The value 
of	such	affirmations	does	not	lie	in	their	formal	legal	effect	because	only	states	
can	 sign	 the	 conventions	 and	 become	 parties.	Nonetheless,	 there	 is	 significant	
symbolic	value	in	gaining	adherence	by	non-state	actors.	First,	it	may	constitute	a	
statement	of	combatant	status	and	seek	to	belie	their	characterization	as	criminals	
or	terrorists.	At	the	very	least,	it	may	suggest	that	sufficient	command	and	control	
capacity	exists	within	a	non-state	organization	 to	enforce	 the	provisions	of	 the	
Geneva	Conventions	and	Additional	Protocols.	Second,	at	least	in	theory,	it	holds	
the	 non-state	 actor	 to	 a	 set	 of	minimum	obligations	 and	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	
agreement	on	what	norms	apply	to	the	conduct	of	hostilities.	
There	is,	of	course,	the	danger	that	the	apparent	acquiescence	by	non-state	
actors	to	the	relevance	of	IHL	through	minimum	standards	or	even	to	the	treaty	
provisions	is	not	followed	in	practice.	So	for	example,	despite	the	FARC’s	position	
of	unilateral	compliance	with	IHL,	a	FARC	spokesperson	informed	Human	Rights	
Watch	that	FARC	guerrillas	“consider	Protocol	II	and	Common	Article	3	[of	the	
Geneva	 Conventions]	 ‘open	 to	 interpretation.’”39	 Further,	 there	 is	 compelling	
35	 See,	for	example,	CorporaCIón humanas, serIe aCCeso a la JustICIa, la sItuaCIón de las muJeres 
VíCtImas de VIolenCIas de Género en el sIstema penal aCusatorIo (2008); CorporaCIón sIsma 
muJer, entre el ConflICto armado y las reformas a la JustICIa, ColombIa 2001-2004 (2005).
36 human rIGhts watCh, war wIthout Quarter: ColombIa and InternatIonal humanItarIan law 
(1998)	(citing	Letter	from	Manuel	Pérez,	released	to	the	press	on	July	15,	1995).	
37 Id. See also FARC Rebels say 3 Americans ‘Prisoners of War’,	CNN,	Feb.	24,	2003,	http://
	 www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/02/24/colombia.us.hostages.reut/index.html	 (discussing	
FARC’s	official	position	that	American	hostages	taken	during	the	course	of	its	conflict	with	the	
Colombian	government	are	regarded	as	prisoners	of	war	under	international	law).
38 See generally	Noelle	Higgins,	The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National 
Liberation,	Journal of humanItarIan assIstanCe	(Apr.	2004),	http://www.jha.ac/articles/a132.pdf.
39 human rIGhts watCh,	supra note 36. 
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evidence	of	routine	non-compliance	with	IHL	by	the	armed	group.40	The	danger	
in	the	Colombian	context,	as	in	others,	is	that	non-state	actors	who	have	not	been	
involved	in	the	negotiations	of	treaties	limiting	the	methods	and	means	of	warfare,	
and	whose	operations	and	training	are	not	systematically	influenced	by	the	need	to	
respect	IHL,	may	simply	view	professions	of	adherence	to	IHL	norms	as	having	
political	currency	but	no	practical	constraining	effect.41	Voluntary	adherence	may	
mean	very	little	in	terms	of	general	accountability	and	have	little	or	no	meaningful	
effect	on	the	behavior	of	the	non-state	actor.	This	requires	close	attention	if	we	
are,	as	this	chapter	suggests,	to	close	the	non-state	accountability	gap	in	situations	
of	armed	conflict	as	a	means	to	better	protect	women’s	human	rights.	
 
 B. Proposed Areas for Feminist Intervention
In	 light	 of	 the	 current	 panorama	 described	 above,	 we	 now	 propose	 three	
potential	 areas	 for	 feminist	 interventions	 to	 improve	 the	 use	 of	 IHL	 norms	 to	
increase	accountability	for	and	protection	from	gendered	harms:	(1)	advocacy	for	
an	expanded	conception	of	 the	 threshold	of	violence	test	 that	might	reflect	more	
accurately	the	reality	of	contemporary	conflicts;	(2)	engagement	with	human	rights	
bodies	that	draw	on	IHL	rules	in	their	human	rights	monitoring	and	adjudication;	and	
(3)	promoting	the	acceptance	of	minimum	humanitarian	standards	for	all	actors.	
1.	Defining	the	Subject	of	IHL:	The	Threshold	of	Violence	Test
Another	 related	 and	 controversial	 issue	 is	 the	 definition	 of	 subject	 in	 the	
field	 of	 humanitarian	 law.	Humanitarian	 law	 requires	 a	 sufficient	 threshold	 of	
violence	to	be	activated,42	a	control	of	territory	requirement,	and	other	measures	
of	the	degree	of	organization	(command	and	control	responsibility	sufficient	to	
disseminate	 international	 humanitarian	 law)	 sufficient	 to	 don	 the	 privilege	 of	
combatant (and also prisoner of war) status. When these thresholds tests were 
conceived,	whether	 in	 the	 post-World	War	 II	 period	 or	 the	 decolonization	 and	
Cold	War	context	of	the	late	1970s,	particular	conceptions	of	conflict	were	in	play.	
Concretely,	the	rules	responded	to	the	conflicts	of	the	time.	In	many	conflicts	the	
40 See generally human rIGhts watCh, supra note 36; human rIGhts watCh, beyond neGotIatIon: 
InternatIonal humanItarIan law and Its applICatIon to the ConduCt of the farC-ep	(2001).
41 See human rIGhts watCh, supra note 36.
42	 Protocol	II,	Article	1(1):	
This	Protocol,	which	develops	and	supplements	Article	3	common	to	the	Geneva	
Conventions	of	12	August	1949	…	shall	apply	to	all	armed	conflicts	which	are	
not	covered	by	[Protocol	1]	.	.	.	and	which	take	place	in	the	territory	of	a	High	
Contracting	Party	between	its	armed	forces	and	dissident	armed	forces	or	other	
organized	 armed	 groups	 which,	 under	 responsible	 command,	 exercise	 such	
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted	military	operations	and	to	implement	this	Protocol.
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splintering	of	internal	conflict	and	the	proliferation	of	armed	groups	mean	that	the	
threshold	requirements	of	IHL	are	ill-fitted	to	the	contemporary	reality	of	violence	
and	the	disintegration	of	the	state	that	has	accompanied	it.	The	requirements	are	
also	 ill-equipped	 to	 address	 the	 forms	 of	 violence	 in	 which	 targeting	 women	
constitutes	a	specific	method	and	means	of	warfare.	
The	proliferation	of	armed	groups	has	characterized	the	Colombian	conflict:	
innumerable	 and	 overlapping	 guerrilla,	 paramilitary	 “self-defense”,	 and	 narco-
trafficking	 groups.	 It	may	 be	 that	 the	 threshold	 of	 violence	 sufficient	 to	 activate	
humanitarian	law	application	requires	greater	contemporary	contextualization—for	
example multiple and splintered violent actors in sum rather than the measure of 
one	 group’s	 effect	 on	 overall	 violence.43	Alternatively,	 the	 threshold	 of	 violence	
measure	 could	 be	 horizontally	 calibrated	 over	 time	 as	 a	 cumulative	 test,	 rather	
than	a	vertical	test	in	which	a	conflict	has	to	satisfy	a	threshold	test	at	a	particular	
pinpoint	moment.	With	 the	violence	experienced	by	women	squarely	 to	 the	 fore,	
what	“counts”	as	violence	for	the	purpose	of	measuring	the	intensity	of	the	conflict	
demands	fundamental	revision,	specifically	the	inclusion	of	a	range	of	acts	currently	
considered	to	fall	within	the	private	sphere.	Gendered	violence	needs	to	be	counted	
as	conflict-related	or	-caused	violence.	If	this	were	to	be	the	case,	a	fuller	and	deeper	
accounting	of	gendered	violence	would	count	into	the	assessment	of	what	constitutes	
an	armed	conflict	and—importantly—what	constitutes	the	end	of	an	armed	conflict.
We	note	 that,	 in	 a	 non-judicial	 context,	 a	 deeper	 accounting	 of	 gendered	
violence has found expression in the Colombian transitional justice process. The 
Historical	Memory	Group,	a	creation	of	the	National	Reparation	and	Reconciliation	
Commission	established	under	the	Justice	and	Peace	Law,	has	been	impressive	in	
its	willingness	to	use	a	gender	perspective	to	challenge	the	very	terms	of	its	own	
investigation.	Thus	 in	 its	 report	 on	 the	massacres	 experienced	 by	 the	 town	 of	
Trujillo,	 the	 terms	“before”	 and	 “after”	 the	massacres	 are	 acknowledged	 to	be	
misleading	terms	when	one	considers	that	gender-based	violence	pervades	normal	
life in the town.44	 In	 the	 section	 dealing	with	 the	memories	 of	women	 victim	
survivors,	the	report	brings	out	women’s	gender-specific	experiences	of	violence	
and	discrimination	within	families	in	the	area,	concluding	that:
[M]any	of	 the	accounts	 that	emerged	about	“before	 the	massacre”	and	
ordinary life demonstrate how the lives of women proceeded within 
practices	of	violent	masculine	domination.	 .	 .	 .	For	 them,	 the	“before”	
does	not	appear	to	have	been	an	idyll	of	peace	and	respect	for	their	rights	
in the domestic ambit.45 
43 For a more detailed exposition of this position see fIonnuala ní aoláIn, the polItICs of the forCe: 
ConflICt manaGement and state VIolenCe In northern Ireland	(2000).
44 ComIsIón naCIonal de reparaCIón y reConCIlIaCIón, Grupo de memoría hIstorICa, truJIllo: una 
traGedIa Que no Cesa	220	(2008).
45 Id. 
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This	section	also	highlights	the	role	of	the	violence	in	determining	relations	
between	 men	 and	 women	 and	 the	 negative	 constructions	 of	 masculinity	 and	
femininity	 in	 the	 community—the	 privileging	 of	 violent	masculinity	 and	 “the	
profound	devaluation	of	the	feminine”	in	the	violent	context	of	Trujillo.46 
Thus,	in	aspects	of	the	transition	less	clearly	determined	by	the	imperatives	
of	 international	 law,	an	alternative	narrative	of	understanding	the	violence—an	
understanding	 inclusive	 of	 women’s	 experiences—has	 found	 expression.	 The	
international	legal	framework	must	be	challenged	to	include	this	type	of	probative	
accounting	for	gendered	experience	in	order	to	more	accurately	define	the	violence	
to	be	included	in	accountability	and	reform	efforts	in	the	aftermath	of	conflict.	
2.	IHL	Monitoring	and	Enforcement	by	Regional	Human	Rights	Bodies
International	and	regional	practice	in	relation	to	the	applicability	and	effect	
of international humanitarian law norms on non-state actors is complex and 
challenging.	The	Inter-American	system	is	generally	recognized	as	being	one	of	
the	most	sophisticated	human	rights	regimes	with	regard	to	its	acceptance	of	the	
relevance	of	humanitarian	 law	to	 the	 interpretation	of	human	rights,	as	well	as	
its	judicial	acceptance	that	in	some	of	the	countries	in	the	region,	humanitarian	
law	rather	than	human	rights	may	be	the	more	fitting	frame	of	reference.47	Both	
the	 Inter-American	 Commission	 and	 Court	 have	 endeavored	 to	 negotiate	 the	
appropriate	 exercise	 of	 their	 human	 rights	 mandate	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	
Colombian	 armed	 conflict.	 The	 Commission’s	 “bullish”48 attempts to enforce 
international	humanitarian	legal	norms	in	the	1990s	were	reined-in	by	the	Court	
in the Las Palmeras	decision,	in	which	the	Court	admitted	that	neither	it	nor	the	
Commission	was	 competent	 to	 apply	 the	Geneva	Conventions.49	Nevertheless,	
the	Court	held	that	both	bodies	are	competent	to	draw	on	the	Geneva	Conventions	
whenever	necessary	to	interpret	a	rule	of	American	Convention.50 The Court has 
reiterated	this	position	several	times	in	respect	of	the	Colombian	conflict.51 
In	this	manner,	the	Court	and	Commission	have	been	able	to	ensure	a	measure	
of	indirect	application	of	international	humanitarian	law	to	the	Colombian	conflict.	
However,	this	indirect	application	of	IHL	applies	only	to	state	acts	and	does	not	
46 Id.	at	229-30.	
47	 James	L.	Cavallaro	&	Stephanie	Erin	Brewer,	Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in 
the Twenty-first Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court,	102	am. J. Int’l l.	768	(2008).
48	 This	 is	 the	 categorization	 of	 the	Commission’s	 approach	 in	 Lindsay	Moir,	Decommissioned? 
International Humanitarian Law and the Inter-American Human Rights System,	25	h.r.Q.	182,	
205	(2003).
49	 Las	Palmeras	v.	Colombia,	Preliminary	Objections,	2000	Inter-Am.	Ct.	H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	67	(Feb.	
4,	2000).
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Mapiripán	Massacre	v.	Colombia,	Merits,	Reparations	and	Costs,	2005	Inter-Am.	Ct.	
H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	134,	para.	155	(Sept.	15,	2005).	
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cover	 violations	 of	 humanitarian	 law	 by	 the	 non-state	 parties	 to	 the	 conflict.	
Accordingly,	the	Inter-American	Commission	decided	in	its	Third	Report	on	the	
Situation	 of	Human	Rights	 in	Colombia	 (1999)52	 that	 it	would	 not	 investigate	
or	hear	 individual	complaints	concerning	acts	by	armed	opposition	groups,	 for	
which the Colombian State is not responsible. 
The	 approach	 of	 the	 Commission	 to	 its	 broader	 country	 reporting	 is	
notably	 distinct	 from	 its	 methodology	 for	 reviewing	 individual	 petitions.	 The	
Commission	does	apply	IHL	to	armed	opposition	groups	in	its	country	reports.	
Country	 reporting	has	been	 framed	by	 reference	 to	 IHL	and	human	 rights	 law	
for	both	state	and	non-state	actors.	Although	this	methodology	does	not	suggest	
any	degree	of	equality	 in	accountability	and	responsibility	between	the	entities	
under	 review,	 it	 is	 valuable	 for	 bringing	 light	 and	 public	 scrutiny	 to	 non-state	
actors.	Clearly,	however,	these	reports	do	not	provide	individuals	with	remedies	
against	violations	of	humanitarian	rules	vis-à-vis	these	actors.	The	differentiated	
standing	of	the	different	actors	reveals	accountability	gaps,	including	the	extent	
to	which	there	are	fora	in	which	violations	can	be	directly	litigated.	Despite	and	
in	response	to	these	limitations,	we	emphasize	the	importance	of	both	horizontal	
accountability (see below) and the use of humanitarian law as a measure in 
assessing	responsibilities	in	the	country-reporting	context. 
3.	The	Promise	of	Minimum	Humanitarian	Standards
In	 the	context	of	 internal	armed	conflicts	we	are	convinced	 that	 the	body	
of	 legal	 norms	 best	 placed	 to	 encompass	 the	 existing	 accountability	 gap	 is	
humanitarian	law.	In	our	view,	greater	acceptance	by	states	that	Common	Article	
3 provides a minimum set of standards by which the actions of both state and 
non-state	 actors	 should	 adhere	 would	 be	 a	 considerable	 advance	 in	 general,	
and provide many positives for women who experience violence in situations 
of	 internal	 armed	 conflict.	We	 appreciate	 that	 the	 explicit	 lack	 of	 recognition	
for	 gendered	 violations	 in	 Common	Article	 3	 is	 a	 limitation.	 Nonetheless,	 its	
“minimum	 standards”	 approach	 and	 the	 capacity	 of	 interpretative	 application	
gives	it	potentially	greater	reach	that	any	other	agreed	instrument.	But	given	some	
of	the	regulatory	difficulties	that	IHL	has	traditionally	encountered	we	encourage	
thinking	again	about	 the	contribution	 that	minimum	humanitarian	codes	might	
make,	with	a	view	to	gendering	such	codes	to	avoid	duplication	of	existing	biases	
in domestic and international criminal law. 
When	states	have	been	unwilling	to	apply	treaty	norms,	and	non-state	actors	
have	seen	themselves	as	excluded	from	IHL	treaty	provisions,	codes	of	conduct	
for	states	experiencing	hostilities	have	been	offered	as	a	way	forward	to	ensure	
52	 Inter-American	Commission	on	Human	Rights,	Third	Report	on	the	Situation	of	Human	Rights	in	
Colombia,	OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102,	doc.	9	rev.	1	(Feb.	26,	1999).
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some	minimal	set	of	legal	obligations	are	observed	by	all	parties.53 These codes 
are	 intended	 to	sidestep	 the	fraught	political	 issues	of	conflict	status	and	allow	
basic	regulatory	provisions	to	be	deemed	relevant	by	all	parties	to	the	conflict.	We	
think	that	they	deserve	further	and	more	detailed	attention	as	a	means	to	address	
normative	rules	and	accountability,	as	well	as	to	focus	attention	on	the	violations	
experienced	by	women	as	breaches	of	humanitarian	norms.	To	that	end,	however,	
we	also	accept	that	such	codes	require	substantive	augmentation	in	order	to	avoid	
duplication	of	the	problem	of	“under-capture”	that	we	ascribe	to	international	and	
domestic criminal law.
Practically,	 how	 would	 the	 codes	 be	 activated?	 Gasser	 makes	 three	
observations	 on	 the	 threshold	 that	 should	 be	 met	 in	 order	 to	 trigger	 their	
applicability:	 first,	 the	 degree	 of	 violence	 exceeds	 normal	 times;	 second,	 the	
violence	is	overt	not	covert;	and	third,	 the	situation	is	characterized	by	general	
violations	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	the	individual.54	Meron,	commenting	on	
the	suitability	of	a	Humanitarian	Declaration	on	 Internal	Strife	emphasizes	 the	
characteristic of collective violence55	as	distinguishing	internal	disturbances	and	
tensions from other violent situations.56	In	this	sense,	we	believe	such	codes	can	
address those multiple contexts (Colombia as representative) where the state does 
not	concede	or	concedes	only	in	part	the	applicability	of	humanitarian	law,	and	
where	the	domestic	criminal	law	is	inadequate	to	capture	the	nature	of	the	harms	
and	may	be	implicated	in	the	broader	dysfunction	of	the	state’s	institutions.	
These	codes	can	serve	a	number	of	useful	purposes,	and	we	think	they	may	
be	an	important	tool	for	policy	makers	and	governments	in	contexts	where	states	
accept in practice (de facto) but not in law (de jure) that a situation of armed 
53	 Hans	Peter	Gasser, A Measure of Humanity in Internal Disturbances and Tensions: Proposal for a 
Code of Conduct, 28	Int’l reV. of the red Cross	38	(1988). Gasser	states	that	the	aim	of	such	rules	
is	to	reduce	human	suffering,	the	object	of	the	code	being	both	authorities	and	non-state	actors	
alike.
54 Id. at 41.
55	 The	ICRC	also	echos	this	theme	of	“collective	violence.”	The	President	of	the	ICRC	has	stated:
The	situation	of	 the	 individual	caught	up	 in	violence	 in	a	State,	violence	 that	
ranges	from	simple	 internal	 tensions	 to	more	serious	 internal	disturbances,	 is	
a	cause	of	deep	concern	to	the	ICRC.	A	suggestion	was	made	recently	to	draft	
a	 declaration	 of	 basic	 and	 inalienable	 rights	 applicable	 to	 cases	 of	 collective	
violence	within	 the	States,	 in	situations	 that	would	not	already	be	covered	by	
humanitarian law.
	 Alexander	Hay,	The ICRC and International Humanitarian Law, 23 Int’l reV. of the red Cross 
3, 9 (1984).
56	 Theodor	Meron,	Towards a Humanitarian Declaration on Internal Strife, 78 am. J. Int’l l. 859 
(1984).	An	important	prescriptive	element	of	these	codes	of	conduct	is	that	they	lack	one	significant	
requirement	of	their	armed	conflict	cousin.	That	is,	no	necessary	degree	of	organization	is	required	
by	third	parties	in	order	to	activate	the	codes	in	question.	The	sole	exception	to	this	is	the	Turku/
Abo	Declaration	which	while	prohibiting	murder	and	violence	 to	 the	person	also	provides	 that	
“whenever	the	use	of	force	is	unavoidable,	it	shall	be	in	proportion	to	the	seriousness	of	the	offence	
or	the	objective	to	be	achieved.”	Turku/Abo	Declaration	of	Minimum	Humanitarian	Standards, 
art.	7	(1990).
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conflict	 exists.	Again,	 drawing	 on	 the	 Roots of War	 study,57 we endorse the 
position	that	normative	reference	points	are	critical	to	preventing	the	violation	
of	humanitarian	norms.	Moreover,	this	study	attests	that	in	situations	of	armed	
conflict,	 violations	 of	 IHL	 involve	 “social	 and	 individual	 processes	 of	 moral	
disengagement”	compounded	by	group	conformity	and	obedience	to	authority.58 
Where	 formal	application	of	 IHL	by	all	parties	may	prove	elusive,	agreement	
to normative standards may in itself (particularly where chains of command in 
organizations	adopt	and	enforce)	be	a	powerful	deterrence	tool.	Second,	a	key	
element	in	preventing	violations	lies	in	ensuring	that	the	bearers	of	weapons	are	
properly	trained.	In	the	absence	of	agreed	treaty	rules,	minimum	standards	may	
provide	the	backdrop	to	training.	If	codes	are	tied	to	strict	and	effective	sanctions	
whether	by	the	state	or	the	non-state	military	structures,	they	potentially	mitigate	
the	use	of	violence	against	women	as	a	method	and	means	of	warfare.	Third,	as	
the	 influence	and	value	of	 soft	 law	deepens,	we	 should	not	underestimate	 the	
extent	to	which	minimum	standards	may	crystallize	and	become	“hard”	binding	
norms over time.
Even	 in	 the	 context	of	minimum	standards,	 identification	and	agreement	
on	the	amount	of	violence	required	is	crucial.	There	is	no	mathematical	equation	
that	sets	a	pre-agreed	limit	on	the	amount	of	acceptable	violence	in	any	particular	
state.	Self-evidently,	cultural	practices	and	developmental	and	financial	capacity	
make	any	such	assessment	subject	to	enormous	disparities.	An	obvious	starting	
point	is	a	determination	of	the	source(s)	of	violence.	This	requires	collating	and	
attributing	the	sources	of	violent	behavior	within	each	state.	Often	the	starting	
point of assessment is the normal levels of criminal activity as measured by 
statistical	 indicators	of	violence	within	 that	 state.	Again	we	 stress	 the	evident	
bias	in	such	collation	that	excludes	“normal”	levels	of	violence	against	women.	
Such	structural	deficiencies	must	be	addressed	 in	order	 to	avoid	humanitarian	
standards	duplicating	the	exclusion	of	gendered	harms.	In	addition,	 the	matter	
becomes more complex as state discretion on what is termed criminal activity is 
exercised. 
It	is	nonetheless	significant	that	there	is	movement	towards	a	definition	of	
“internal	 disturbances	 and	 tensions”	 that	would	be	 sufficient	 to	 apply	 across	 a	
range	of	conflicts.	In	this	context,	we	emphasize	the	importance	of	including	the	
range	and	depth	of	violence	 experienced	by	women	as	part	 of	 the	 calculation.	
The	 danger	 is	 that	 narrow	 definitions,	 based	 on	 ever-present	 public/private	
distinctions,	may	mean	that	gendered	presumptions	are	simply	moved	from	one	
arena to another.
57	 ICRC,	supra	note	26,	at	4.
58	 ICRC,	supra	note	26,	at	2.
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III. Imputed State Liability for the Violence of the Non-state Actor
The	key	issues	addressed	in	this	section	focus	on	the	means	by	which	the	
actions	 of	 the	 non-state	 actor	 can	 be	 captured	 by	 the	 legal	 obligations	 taken	
on by the State under international law. The concept and practices of imputed 
state	 liability	 are	 critical	 to	 addressing	 the	 degree	 and	 capacity	 for	 state	 legal	
obligations	to	capture	harms	committed	by	the	non-state	entity.	We	assess	these	
issues	by	focusing	on	violence	against	women	through	the	prism	of	disarmament,	
demobilization,	 and	 reintegration	 (DDR)	 processes	 that	 almost	 invariably	
accompany	the	post-conflict	process.
 A. DDR, the Post-Conflict Process, and Gendered Outcomes
The	Justice	and	Peace	process	has	given	rise	to	a	set	of	problems	in	Colombia	
that	 are	 familiar	 to	 those	who	write	 and	 research	more	 generally	 on	 violence	
against	women	as	it	manifests	at	the	end	of	conflict.	Processes	of	disarmament,	
demobilization,	and	reintegration	of	combatants	are	increasingly	central	to	efforts	
to	build	sustainable	peace	in	the	aftermath	of	violent	conflict.59	Without	ignoring	
the presence of women in combatant forces or the prominence of men in civilian 
populations,	there	is	nevertheless	an	often	unspoken	gender	piece	to	DDR:	namely,	
that	the	process	involves	the	reintegration	of	a	largely	male	(former)	combatant	
group	 into	a	disproportionately	 female	civilian	population.	By	and	 large,	DDR	
processes	are	directed	at	societies	in	which	there	have	been	significant	non-state	
sources	 of	 violence.	 The	 gender	 differential	 between	 returning	 and	 receiving	
communities	means	 that,	 although	DDR	 is	 officially	 concerned	with	 ensuring	
the conditions that enable former combatants to cease violence and return to 
their	communities	of	origin,	DDR	can	also	ignite	a	series	of	new	challenges	for	
women’s	security	within	the	community.	
In	order	to	illustrate	some	of	the	“new”	gender	dynamics	of	violence	that	
can	accompany	processes	of	DDR,	it	is	instructive	to	draw	on	empirical	research	
conducted	by	Colombian	women’s	organizations	examining	the	impact	of	DDR	
on	the	lives	of	women	living	in	the	rehabilitation	and	consolidation	zones.	Based	
on	analysis	of	the	short-	and	long-term	impacts,	such	research	has	regarded	the	
process	of	reintegration	under	the	terms	of	the	Justice	and	Peace	Law	as	a	threat	
59 See, e.g.,	 U.N.	 Dep’t	 of	 Peacekeeping	 Operations,	 Lessons	 Learned	 Unit,	 Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles 
and Guidelines	 (2000);	 Mats	 R.	 Berdal,	 Int’l	 Inst.	 for	 Strategic	 Stud.,	 ADELPHI	 Paper	 303,	
Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of 
Armed Conflicts,	at	9	(1996);	KImberly mahlInG ClarK, usaId, fosterInG a farewell to arms: 
prelImInary lessons learned In the demobIlIzatIon and reInteGratIon of Combatants (1996); 
Mark	Knight,	Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former 
Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,	41	J. peaCe res.	499	(2004).
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to	the	security	of	women.	Early	on	in	the	DDR	process,	women’s	organizations	
monitoring	the	reintegration	process	in	Tierralta,	Córdoba	identified	an	increase	
in	levels	of	prostitution,	sexually-transmitted	diseases,	and	teenage	pregnancy.60 
They	noted	 alarming	 increases	 in	 levels	 of	 domestic	 violence,	 as	 relationships	
were	 forged	 or	 reignited	 between	 former	 combatants	 and	 members	 of	 the	
civilian population.61	In	this	catalogue	of	harms	we	directly	confront	the	material	
consequences	 of	 the	 public/private	 distinction	 in	 transitional	 justice.	 Teenage	
pregnancy,	 poor	 sexual	 health,	 and	 domestic	 violence	 fall	 within	 the	 sphere	
of	private	harms.	Perceived	as	unrelated	 to	 the	public	violence	of	paramilitary	
groups,	the	proliferation	of	such	harms	against	women	does	not	inform	political	
calculations	of	costs	and	benefits	in	the	negotiation	of	demobilization.	The	broader	
problem	is	the	evident	disconnect	between	the	planning	of	DDR	programs—as	
well	as	the	benchmarking	of	their	success—and	the	lived	experience	of	women	in	
the	receiving	communities.62
Compounding	 the	 gendered	 gaps	 of	 a	 gender-blind	 DDR	 process	 is	 the	
weakened	and	fractured	nature	of	the	state	operating	in	the	backdrop	to	the	non-state	
demobilization.	In	this	telling,	the	lack	of	central	state	capacity	to	fundamentally	
affect	the	“on	the	ground”	experience	of	DDR,	means	that	our	assumptions	about	
the capacity of the state to control and prevent violence in the transitional context are 
significantly	undermined.	The	weak	state	presence	has	meant	that	absolute	impunity	
surrounds	the	violence	experienced	by	women	in	the	“post”	conflict	phase.	
Equally,	DDR	does	not	mean	the	re-establishment	of	the	state	or	the	legitimacy	
of	its	institutions.	This	is	demonstrated	in	part	by	the	ongoing	evidence	of	political	
influence	by	former	paramilitaries	going	largely	unchallenged.	Returning	combatants	
have	displaced	civilian	population	from	paid	work	and	political	leadership	within	
receiving	communities.63	Leaders	of	women’s	organizations	have	been	targeted	for	
paramilitary violence and assassination.64	In	the	longer-term,	the	DDR	process	has	
been	criticized	by	women’s	organizations	for	institutionalizing	paramilitary	influence	
and	 power	within	 the	 demobilization	 zones,	 such	 as	Villavicencio,	 southeast	 of	
Bogotá.65	The	disarmament	process	was	highly	partial	and	largely	inadequate.	Large	
numbers	of	 the	demobilized	have	 returned	 to	 criminal	 activities.	One	 influential	
women’s	organization	concluded	that	the	ongoing	economic,	political,	and	military	
60 CorporaCIón humanas, rIesGos para la seGurIdad de las muJeres en proCesos de reInserCIón de 
exCombatIente: estudIo sobre el ImpaCto de la reInserCIón paramIlItar en la VIda y seGurIdad de 
las muJeres en los munICIpIos de montería y tIerralta departamento de Córdoba 67 (2005).
61 Id. at 73.
62	 Fionnuala	 Ní	 Aoláin,	 Women, Security, and the Patriarchy of Internationalized Transitional 
Justice,	31	hum. rts. Q.	1055	(2009).
63 CorporaCIón humanas,	supra	note	60,	at	44.
64 CorporaCIón humanas,	supra	note	60,	at	44.
65 CorporaCIón humanas, muJeres entre mafIosos y señores de la Guerra: ImpaCto del proCeso de 
desarme, desmoVIlIzaCIón y reInteGraCIón en la VIda y seGurIdad de las muJeres en ComunIdades 
en puGna	(2008).
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influence	of	“demobilized”	groups	was	perpetuating	paramilitarism	in	the	country,	
as	young	men	aspire	to	the	status	and	power	of	paramilitaries	and	young	women	
aspire	to	be	with	them	(a	fact	graphically	illustrated	by	the	alarming	rates	of	teenage	
pregnancy	in	the	area).66 Criminal activities and the limitation of political expression 
fall more readily within the sphere of public harms in transitional justice. Evidence 
of	 public	 harms	 resulting	 from	DDR	 poses	 challenges	 to	 transitional	 justice	 in	
Colombia,	even	on	its	own	narrowly	stated	terms	of	ending	the	public	violence	of	
paramilitary	groups.	
These	 results	 require	 us	 to	 rethink	 the	 form	and	 terms	upon	which	DDR	
programs	 are	 negotiated,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 basis	 upon	 which	 they	 are	 deemed	
successful.	But,	more	pertinently,	they	mandate	thinking	through	the	conundrum	
of	legal	responsibility	for	the	failure	of	DDR	and	the	locus	of	responsibility	for	
the	violence	that	continues	against	women	in	the	aftermath	of	conflict.	When	the	
conflict	 is	 theoretically	ended	by	 the	state,	but	 the	non-state	actor	continues	 to	
exercise	violence,	albeit	now	in	the	theoretically	private	sphere	of	violence	against	
women	and	non-political	criminality,	where	does	legal	responsibility	lie?
 B. The Non-state Conundrum and the Feminist Response
The	posture	of	many	Colombian	women’s	organizations	toward	paramilitary	
forces	 reflects	 a	 more	 general	 posture	 of	 feminists	 towards	 non-state	 actors.	
The	non-state	actor	is	identified	as	masculine,	and	in	the	context	of	conflict	and	
repression	 as	 portraying	 hyper-masculine	 traits,67 as well as an inherent and 
unreformed	patriarchy	that	negatively	impacts	on	women.	The	non-state	actor	is	
viewed	as	unpredictable	and	unconstrained,	and	it	is	unclear	to	feminists	(as	it	is	to	
other	theoretical	approaches),68 how the non-state actor is to be held accountable 
for	his	actions,	specifically	as	they	affect	women.	This	lack	of	predictability	and	
stability	may	explain	feminist	unwillingness	to	expend	significant	theory,	policy,	
or advocacy attention to non-state entities.
Connectedly,	any	discussion	of	feminism	and	the	non-state	actor	mandates	
acknowledging	 the	 theorizing	 and	 policy	 that	 has	 emerged	 from	 women’s	
engagement	with	national	liberation	movements.	In	parallel,	the	status	of	women	
within,	 and	 the	 relationship	 of	 feminism	 to,	 national	 liberation	 movements	
has	seldom	led	 to	a	direct	 feminist	engagement	with	such	entities.69	 In	general	
66 Id.	at	52.
67 See Kimberly	Theidon,	Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
of Former Combatants in Colombia,	1	Int’l J. transItIonal Just. 66	(2007);	nIra yuVal-daVIs, 
Gender and natIon (1997).
68	 See,	for	example,	on	the	challenge	of	non-state	actors	to	traditional	approaches	to	security	studies,	
Steve	Smith,	The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last 
Twenty Years,	20	Contemp. seCurIty pol’y	72	(1999).
69	 See,	 for	 example,	 Gender and natIonal IdentIty: women and polItICs In muslIm soCIetIes 
(Valentine	M.	Moghadam	ed.,	1994).
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feminists	 have	 identified	 the	 complex	 paradox	 that	 frequently	 results	 from	
women’s	 involvement	 in	 national	 struggles.	 The	 involvement	 of	 women	 as	
combatants	 in	national	 liberations	movements,	and	 the	more	mundane	work	of	
women	in	reproducing70	and	sustaining	the	boundaries	on	which	such	movements	
depend,71	has	given	rise	to	this	largely	negative	feminist	assessment.	Pragmatic	
acquiescence	to	women’s	engagement	is	balanced	by	an	unwillingness	to	assume	
that	 a	 reformist	 agenda	will	 transform	 such	movements.	As	 a	 result	 reformist	
attention	 remains	firmly	 focused	 on	 the	 state.	Notably	 the	 category	 of	women	
combatants (or even women as tacit supporters of violence) poses particular 
quandaries	 theoretically	 and	practically	 to	 this	 body	of	 feminist	work.	Various	
scholarly	disciplines	are	pervaded	by	the	“assumption	that	women	are	generally	
more	peaceful	and	less	aggressive	or	warlike	than	men.”72	Generally	speaking,	the	
quantification	of	and	rationale	for	women’s	political	violence	are	grossly	under-
researched arenas across academic disciplines.73 
This paucity of research is tied to complex social conventions about the role 
of	women	in	the	military	apparatus	of	the	state,	or	any	roles	that	women	may	play	
within	non-state	structures	in	conflicted	societies.	Here	also	“the	prevalent	view	of	
women	as	victims	of	conflict	.	.	.	tends	to	overlook,	explicitly	or	implicitly,	women’s	
power	and	agency.”74 This blind spot tends to produce policy and practice that views 
women	as	 homogeneously	powerless	 or	 as	 implicit	 victims,	 thereby	 excluding	
the	parallel	reality	of	women	as	benefactors	of	oppression,	“or	the	perpetrators	
of	catastrophes.”75	Moreover,	women’s	active	roles	in	national	or	ethno-national	
military	organizations	 is	defined	by	deep	ambiguity	 linked	 to	 resonant	debates	
about	the	identity	of	nation,	the	meaning	of	citizenship,	and	the	complex	interface	
between	cultural	reproduction	and	gender	roles	in	any	society.76	Nevertheless,	the	
poor	correlation	between	levels	of	women’s	involvement	in	combatant	activities	
70 See generally yuVal-daVIs, supra note 67.
71 See,	for	example,	Begoña	Aretxaga’s	work	on	women	and	nationalism	in	Northern	Ireland:	beGoña 
aretxaGa, shatterInG sIlenCe: women, natIonalIsm, and polItICal subJeCtIVIty In northern Ireland 
ix	(1997)	(“Women	are	the	backbone	of	the	struggle;	they	are	the	ones	carrying	the	war	here.”).
72 mIranda alIson, women and polItICal VIolenCe	1	(2008).
73	 In	 the	 sometimes	 related	 sphere	 of	 human	 trafficking,	 see	 for	 example,	 Report	 of	 the	 Special	
Rapporteur	on	the	human	rights	aspects	of	the	victims	of	trafficking	in	persons,	especially	women	
and	children,	Sigma	Huda,	21-25,	U.N.	Doc.	A/HRC/4/23/Add.1	(2007),	which	sent	shockwaves	
through	the	community	of	persons	interested	in,	but	not	intimately	knowledgeable	about	human	
trafficking,	when	it	named	women	as	traffickers.	
74	 Simona	Sharoni,	Rethinking Women’s Struggles in Israel-Palestine and in the North of Ireland,	in 
VICtIms, perpetrators or aCtors? Gender, armed ConflICt and polItICal VIolenCe	86	(Caroline	
Moser	&	Fiona	Clark	eds.,	2001).
75 ronIt lentIn, Gender and Catastrophe 12 (1997).
76 See yuVal-daVIs, supra	note	59.	See	also	the	assessment	of	the	position	of	the	20,000	odd	women	
who	fought	 in	 the	Marxist	Eritrean	People’s	Liberation	Front,	whose	return	back	 into	a	deeply	
patriarchal	society	has	been	fraught	on	numerous	 levels,	James	C.	McKinley,	Eritrea’s Women 
Fighters Long for Equality of War,	the GuardIan,	May	6,	1995.	
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and the status of women in postcolonial states77	bears	out	Cynthia	Enloe’s	assertion	
that	national	 liberation	movements	 tend	 to	adopt	a	position	of	“not	now,	 later”	
in	 respect	 to	women’s	 equality.78	 In	 parallel,	 one	 element	 of	murky	 results	 for	
women	in	the	post-conflict	context	is	that	the	involvement	of	women	in	securing	
liberation/gaining	independence	gives	little	clear	correlation	to	accountability	for	
gendered	violations	committed	in	contribution	to	that	political	outcome.
This	largely	negative	feminist	assessment	of	non-state	actors	has,	in	turn,	
tended	 to	 cast	 the	 state	 in	 the	 role	 of	 “protector,”	 as	 the	 guarantor	 of	 liberal	
legal	rights	to	equality	and	non-discrimination.	Although	imperfect,	the	state’s	
de	 jure	guarantees	of	equality	offer	greater	protection	and	greater	 leverage	on	
decision-making	within	the	state	than	within	any	of	a	range	of	non-state	actors.	
But,	 in	 simple	 terms	 of	 numerical	 presence,	 women	 remain	 vastly	 under-
represented within the state;79 and empirical research demonstrates the cross-
regional	 truth	 that	women’s	political	activity	 is	concentrated	within	 local	civil	
society	organization.80	Nevertheless,	for	women’s	movements	seeking	to	make	
political	gains,	their	advocacy	is	remarkable	consistent	in	targeting	the	state.	We	
do not doubt the value and importance of that endeavor. The state is and will 
remain	 a	 legitimate	 site	 of	 feminist	 activity	 and	 feminist	 gains.	However,	we	
suggest,	as	the	analysis	above	begins	to	explore,	that	in	tandem	feminists	must	
also	be	concerned	with	the	non-state	actor	and	seek	to	influence	their	actions	and	
institutional	structures.	Below	we	explore	how	non-state	actors’	actions	can	be	
influenced	by	pursuing	state	accountability	for	gendered	violence	perpetrated	by	
non-state	groups.	We	suggest	that,	raising	the	political	and	legal	costs	to	states	
for	public	and	private	forms	of	violence	against	women	by	non-state	entities	will	
motivate	states	to	better	ensure	the	physical	integrity	of	women	while	negotiating	
political compromises. 
 C. Due Diligence as a Method to Influence the Non-state Actor
The	 privileging	 of	 the	 state	 is	 a	 point	 of	 concurrence	 between	 feminist	
interventions	into	transitional	justice	and	the	organization	of	international	human	
rights	law.	States	assume	human	rights	obligations	and	accountability	for	human	
rights	violations	by	treaty.	Traditionally,	these	obligations	were	understood	to	govern	
the	vertical	relationship	of	states	to	citizens.	However,	the	developing	doctrine	of	
77	 For	discussion	of	these	dynamics	in	the	Eritrean	and	Colombian	cases,	respectively,	see	Patricia	
Campbell,	Gender and Post-Conflict Civil Society,	7	 Int’l fem. J. pol.	377	(2005);	luz maría 
londoño f. & yoana fernanda nIeto V., muJeres no Contadas: proCesos de demoVIlIzaCIón y 
retorno a la VIda CIVIl de muJeres exCombatIentes en ColombIa 1990-2003 (2007).
78 CynthIa enloe, the mornInG after: sexual polItICs at the end of the Cold war	(1993).
79	 See,	for	example,	the	number	of	women	in	the	parliaments	of	the	world,	available	at	the	website	of	
the	Inter-Parliamentarian	Union,	http://www.ipu.org.	
80 See the ChallenGe of loCal femInIsms: women’s moVements In Global perspeCtIVe	 (Amrita	
Basu	ed.,	1995).	
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due	diligence	has	introduced	the	notion	of	horizontal	application	of	human	rights,	
namely	that	human	rights	also	bind	the	relationship	between	citizens.	In	practice,	
this	accountability	is	affected	through	the	state.	Due	diligence	obligations	require	
states	to	protect	an	individual’s	human	rights	from	violations	by	another	private	
individual.	Due	diligence	doctrine	has	been	one	of	the	most	significant	developments	
in	making	international	human	rights	law	relevant	to	women’s	daily	experiences	
of violence.81	The	articulation	of	states’	duties	to	prevent,	prohibit,	investigate,	and	
punish	crimes	of	violence	against	women—predominantly	occurring	within	homes	
and	communities,	at	the	hands	of	private	actors—has	been	critical.	
In	transitional	contexts,	in	which	the	state	is	fragile	and	mass	crimes	of	violence	
may	persist,	there	can	be	a	struggle	to	make	due	diligence	obligations	pertinent	to	
violence	against	women.	Nevertheless,	violent	conflict	does	not	exempt	states	from	
their	due	diligence	obligations.	And	as	we	examine	here,	an	important	body	of	law	
exists	for	advancing	accountability,	much	of	it	directly	relevant	to	the	Colombian	
context.	With	an	eye	toward	gendered	violence	accompanying	a	failed	or	deficient	
DDR	process,	we	trace	several	major	legal	developments	that,	when	read	together,	
support	the	expansion	of	state	accountability	for	non-state	actors,	including:	broader	
acceptance	of	gendered	harms	in	traditional	norms	in	due	diligence	requirements;	
extension of state responsibility to non-state actors for public harms; and due 
diligence	analysis	applied	to	private	harms	as	discrimination.
1.	 Capturing	Gender-based	Violence
The	 Inter-American	 human	 rights	 system	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	 most	
progressive	in	its	codification	of	the	right	of	women	to	live	free	from	violence.	
The	Inter-American	Convention	of	Belém	do	Pará,	adopted	in	1994,	remains	the	
only	binding	international	human	rights	instrument	dedicated	to	the	prevention,	
punishment,	 and	 eradication	 of	 violence	 against	 women.82 The Convention 
includes a mechanism for the communication of individual complaints to the 
Inter-American	Commission.83	While	 the	 Inter-American	Court	 has	 been	more	
conservative	 in	 its	 jurisprudential	development	of	women’s	 rights	 to	 live	 from	
free	from	violence,84	recent	decisions	signal	an	important	new	trajectory.
The	 2006	 decision	 concerning	 the	 sexual	 abuse	 of	 women	 detainees	 in	
the	 Peruvian	Miguel	 Castro-Castro	 prison	 has	 set	 an	 important	 marker	 in	 the	
81 See	 Rebecca	Cook,	Accountability in International Law for Violations of Women’s Rights by 
Non-State Actors,	25	stud. transnat’l leGal pol’y	93	(1993).
82	 Inter-American	 Convention	 for	 the	 Prevention,	 Punishment,	 and	 Eradication	 of	 Violence 
Against	Women,	“Convention	of	Belem	do	Para”,	June	9,	1994,	33	ILM	1534,	entered into force 
Mar.	5,	1995.
83 Id.	art.	12.	
84 See Patricia	Palacios	Zuloaga,	The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,	17	tex. J. women & l. 228	(2008).
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recognition	of	gender-specific	forms	of	inhuman	treatment.85	Acts	such	as	being	
surrounded	by	 security	 forces	while	 required	 to	 strip	 and	 remain	naked	 for	 an	
extended	 period,	 being	 prohibited	 from	 showering,	 being	 accompanied	 to	 the	
bathroom	 by	 male	 guards,	 and	 denial	 of	 post-partum	medical	 attention,	 were	
recognized	 as	 constituting	 “inhuman	 treatment”	 in	 violation	 of	 the	American	
Convention	on	Human	Rights.86	Given	 that	 these	human	rights	violations	were	
perpetrated	by	state	actors,	within	a	state	institution,	the	decision	coheres	with	the	
traditional	state-centric	nature	of	human	rights.	
The	 State	was	 found	 to	 be	 in	 violation	 of	 its	 due	 diligence	 obligations	 to	
investigate	alleged	cases	of	torture.87	Further,	in	awarding	reparations,	the	Court	made	
specific	consideration	of	the	different	types	of	violence	to	which	the	women	were	
subjected.88	Finally,	the	decision	marked	an	important	precedent	in	establishing	the	
justiciability	of	the	Convention	of	Belém	do	Pará.	While	the	Peruvian	government	
argued	 that	 the	 communications	 alleging	 violations	 of	 rights	 guaranteed	 under	
the	 Convention	 could	 only	 be	 considered	 by	 the	 Inter-American	 Commission,89 
the	Court	found	the	State	in	violation	of	its	Article	7(b)	obligation	to	investigate	
and	punish	violence	against	women.	Read	together,	these	different	aspects	of	the	
Court’s	 decision	 reiterate	 states’	 duty	 to	 prevent,	 punish,	 and	 eradicate	 violence	
against	women;	to	investigate	allegations	of	torture,	including	gender-based	forms	
of sexual torture of women; and to appropriately compensate female victims of 
sexual	violence.	This	language	lays	a	strong	foundation	for	the	application	of	such	
principles	in	many	other	contexts,	including	horizontally	to	non-state	actors.
 
2.	 Imputed	State	Liability	for	Paramilitary	“Public”	Violence
While the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison case concerned directly state-perpe-
trated	violence	against	women,	innovative	jurisprudence	by	international	courts	
and	tribunals	has	increasingly	found	that	a	state	may	be	held	responsible	for	the	
actions	of	private	actors	when	it	fails	to	set	appropriate	regulatory	standards,	en-
courages	non-enforcement	of	the	relevant	legal	norms,	or	minimizes	sanction.90 
The	Inter-American	Court	has	led	the	international	human	rights	community	in	its	
imputation	of	state	liability	for	violations	of	human	rights	by	private	parties.91 
Here	 the	Court’s	 jurisprudence	 has	 specifically	 addressed	 the	Colombian	
State’s	 liability	 for	 human	 rights	 violations	 perpetrated	by	paramilitary	 groups	
85	 Miguel	Castro-Castro	Prison	v.	Peru,	2006	Inter-Am.	Ct.	H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	160	(Nov.	25,	2006).
86 Id.	para.	197.
87 Id. para. 347.
88 Id.	para.	432.
89 Id.	para.	379.
90 See generally andrew Clapham, human rIGhts oblIGatIons of non-state aCtors (2006).
91 See especially	Velasquez	Rodriguez	v.	Honduras,	1988	Inter-Am.Ct.H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	4	(July	29,	
1988).
140
based	on	the	degree	of	ties	between	parts	of	the	State	and	certain	groups.92 The 
paramilitary	 and	 political	 activities	 of	 the	 paramilitaries	 continue	 today,93 and 
the	 Inter-American	Court	 has	 held	 the	Colombian	State	 accountable	 for	many	
of	 the	most	 serious	 public	 harms	 of	 the	 paramilitaries	 which	 occurred	 during	
the	conflict.	For	example,	in	the	Mapiripán Massacre	case,	the	Court	found	the	
Colombian	State	responsible	for	the	abductions,	torture,	and	killings	committed	
by	 the	paramilitary	or	self-defense	groups,	due	 to	 the	“link	between	the	armed	
forces	and	 this	paramilitary	group	 to	commit	 the	massacre	 .	 .	 .	 conducted	 in	a	
coordinated,	parallel	or	 linked	manner.”94	This	 linkage	allied	with	an	emphasis	
on	 due	 diligence	 remains	 critical	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 women	 in	 situations	 of	
armed	conflict.	The	Court’s	decision	in	the	Mapiripán Massacre case can be read 
together	with	the	Miguel Castro-Castro Prison decision to impute liability to the 
Colombian	State	for	the	alarming	levels	of	public	harms	against	women,	such	as	
the	assassination	of	leaders	of	women’s	organizations,	perpetrated	by	paramilitary	
forces. 
3.	International	Human	Rights	Law	and	Capturing	“Private”	Harms
One	important	theoretical	frame	in	examining	the	violence	experienced	by	
women	 is	 the	public/private	 divide	 and	how	 that	 intersects	with	 the	 state/non-
state	 paradigm.	The	 implications	 for	women	 of	 the	 public/private	 divide	 have	
been well documented by feminist scholars.95	 Law’s	 oversight	 of	 the	 private	
domain	 is	 purposely	 constrained,	 and	 that	 deemed	 private	 remains	 effectively	
out-of-regulatory-bounds.	The	difficulties	of	the	public/private	divide	applied	to	
the	state	and	non-state	continuum	are	to	some	degree	self-evident.	Regarding	the	
application	of	 international	 law	norms,	 the	 state	 is	 evidently	held	 to	 the	 treaty	
standards	of	human	rights	enforcement	when	violations	take	place	in	the	public	
sphere	and	involve	a	state	official.	
Horizontal	application	of	human	rights	norms	has	been	highly	relevant	 to	
women	seeking	to	“catch”	violations	taking	place	in	the	private	sphere.	In	particular,	
jurisprudence	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,96	and	the	growing	body	
of	jurisprudence	of	the	CEDAW	Committee,	have	focused	on	the	elaboration	of	
states’	due	diligence	obligation	to	prevent,	prohibit,	investigate,	and	punish	acts	of	
92 See, e.g.,	Mapiripán	Massacre	v.	Colombia,	Merits,	Reparations	and	Costs,	2005	Inter-Am.	Ct.	
H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	134	(Sept.	15,	2005).
93 GustaVo dunCan,	los señores de la Guerra: de paramIlItares, mafIosos y autodefensas en 
ColombIa	(2006).
94 Mapiripán,	supra	note	92,	para.	123.
95	 Feminist	 theorists	have	long	articulated	that	 the	most	pervasive	harms	to	women	tend	to	occur	
within	the	inner	sanctum	of	the	private	realm,	within	the	family.	See sally enGle merry, human 
rIGhts and Gender VIolenCe: translatInG InternatIonal law Into loCal JustICe (2006).
96	 M.C.	v	Bulgaria,	[2003]	ECHR	39272/98	(Dec.	4,	2003);	Opuz	v.	Turkey,	[2009]	ECHR	33401/02	
(June	9,	2009).
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so-called	private	violence,	in	particular,	domestic	violence.97	Importantly,	within	
this	articulation	of	states’	due	diligence	obligations,	impunity	for	violence	against	
women	has	been	explicitly	recognized	as	discrimination	against	women.	A	state’s	
failure to respond appropriately to forms of private violence that are experienced 
overwhelmingly	by	women	 is	 in	violation	of	 the	 state’s	obligations	 to	provide	
equal	protection	of	the	law	and	is	consequently	discriminatory	against	women.	
The	Inter-American	Court	of	Human	Rights	has	now	joined	and	reaffirmed	
this	important	trajectory	in	international	human	rights	law	and	the	right	of	women	
to live free from all forms of violence in the Campo Algodonero case.98 The Court 
for	the	first	time	found	a	state	in	violation	of	its	affirmative	obligations	to	respond	
to	 violence	 against	women	 by	 private	 actors.	The	 decision	 concerned	 three	 in	
a	series	of	hundreds	of	unsolved	and	poorly	investigated	disappearances,	rapes,	
and	murders	 of	 young	women	 in	 Ciudad	 Juarez	 on	 the	 U.S.-Mexican	 border.	
Significantly,	the	Court	considered	the	human	rights	violations	in	Mexico	within	
the	 context	 of	 mass	 violence	 against	 women	 and	 structural	 discrimination	 in	
Ciudad	Juarez.	The	Court	found	that	the	“culture	of	discrimination”	against	women	
within	the	city	had	penetrated	the	response	of	State	institutions	to	the	alarming	
levels	of	violence	against	women,	resulting	in	poor	criminal	 investigations	and	
the perpetuation of impunity for such violence.99	Noteworthy	also	is	that,	drawing	
on	the	definition	of	violence	against	women	of	both	the	CEDAW	Committee	in	its	
General	Recommendation	19	and	the	Convention	of	Belém	do	Pará,	the	Court	for	
the	first	time	held	that	gender-based	violence	can	constitute	discrimination	against	
women.100 Mexico was ordered to comply with a broad set of remedial measures 
including	a	national	memorial,	 renewed	 investigations,	and	 reparations	of	over	
$200,000	each	to	the	families	in	the	suit.101 
The implications of the Campo Algodonero decision for the Colombian 
context	and	more	broadly	are	substantial.	The	Court’s	determination	to	consider	
individual	incidents	of	violence	against	women	within	the	context	of	mass	violence	
against	women	and	structural	discrimination	is	highly	pertinent	to	the	Colombian	
context. This comprehensive and contextual approach to state complicity in 
perpetuating	violence	against	women	by	private	actors	should	draw	attention	and	
legal	responsibility	to	the	relationship	between	the	State’s	role	in	negotiating	the	
97 See, e.g.,	AT	v.	Hungary,	(Communication	No.	2/2003),	Views of the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women under article 7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	 (Jan.	26,	2005);	
Andrew	Byrnes	&	Eleanor	Bath,	Violence against Women, the Obligation of Due Diligence, and 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,	8	
hum. rts. l. reV.	517	(2008).
98	 González	 and	Others	 (“Campo	Algodonero”)	 vs.	Mexico,	 Preliminary	Considerations,	Merits,	
Reparations	and	Costs,	2009	Inter-Am.	Ct.	H.R.	(ser.	C)	No.	205	(Nov.	16,	2009).	
99 Id.	paras.	399-400.
100 Id.	paras.	395	&	402.
101 Id. Part	IX,	Reparations.
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terms	of	demobilization	of	paramilitary	actors	and	the	alarming	levels	of	public	
and	private	harms	against	women	within	the	demobilization	zones.	While	state	
actors	may	not	be	the	direct	perpetrators	of	these	harms,	and	the	range	of	harms	
identified	 goes	 beyond	 the	 abductions,	 torture,	 and	 killings	 by	 paramilitaries	
addressed in the Mapiripán	case,	the	Colombian	State	has	clear	legal	obligations	
to	prevent,	protect,	investigate,	punish,	and	compensate	for	the	full	range	of	public	
and	private	harms	experienced	by	women	within	the	demilitarization	zones.	
Conclusion: Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and 
Re-calibrating State Interests in the Negotiation of Transitional Justice
As	we	conclude	this	chapter	we	come	back	to	the	point	at	which	the	issues	
of	 accountability	 are	 most	 squarely	 on	 the	 table	 (or	 clearly	 absent	 from	 the	
table)—namely	 at	 the	 point	 of	 negotiation	 between	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors.	
While	a	peace	deal	may	transform	relations	between	violent	actors,	it	will	likely	
do	very	little	for	social	relations	within	the	zones	controlled	by	particular	groups	
of	violent	actors.	A	peace	deal	may	also	do	very	 little	 to	 resolve	 the	 legal	and	
structural	 ambiguities	 that	 pervade	 prior	 and	 continuing	 overlapping	 regimes	
of	control	 that	have	characterized	 the	conflicted	non-state	and	state	zones.	The	
constructive	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 peace	 deal	may	 in	 fact	 incorporate	 that	 tension	
and	reality	directly	into	new	arrangements.102	In	Colombia,	the	DDR	process	is	
widely	attributed	with	legitimating	paramilitary	social	control,	rather	than	ending	
it.103	Moreover	 it	 is	 seen	as	giving	 rise	 to	 concern	 that	 the	de	 facto	black	hole	
of	accountability	created	by	the	paramilitaries	has	been	institutionalized	by	the	
contemporary	 process.	We	 suggest	 that	 political	 compromises	 at	 the	 heart	 of	
peace	deals	often	involve	unspoken	compromises	around	private	harms	and—in	
effect—women’s	security,	as	borne	out	by	the	evidence	of	high	levels	of	violence	
against	women	within	demobilization	zones.	The	lack	of	accountability	for	prior	
violations	against	women	and	others	may	be	part	of	the	stated	trade-off	for	the	end	
of	public	contestation	between	male	combatants.	Moreover,	continued	violence	
against	women	will	not	be	viewed	as	undermining	the	basis	of	the	“deal”	itself	
and	will	 be	 entirely	 incidental	 to	 its	 perceived	 success	 or	 failure.	How	do	we	
address	this	reality?
We	are	not	naive	in	presuming	that	gender	is	likely	to	move	easily	to	center	
stage	in	such	processes	and	dominate	the	“deals”	that	are	made,	despite	the	dictates	
of	gender	mainstreaming	and	UN	Security	Council	Resolution	1325.	Nonetheless,	
102	 Chrisitine	Bell	&	Kathleeen	Cavaunaugh,	Constructive Ambiguity or Internal Self-Determination? 
Self-Determination, Group Accommodation and the Belfast Agreement,	 22	fordham Int’l L.J.	
1345	(1999).
103 See, e.g.,	CorporaCIón humanas,	supra	note	60,	at	67.
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in	order	to	address	the	clear	lacunae	in	gendered	accountability	we	suggest	some	
routes	forward.	The	first	is	that	feminists,	policy	makers,	and	others	need	to	pay	
more	attention	to	non-state	actors,	not	only	as	perpetrators	of	violence	but	rather	
as	entities	of	control	and	oversight.	In	this	latter	capacity,	close	attention	needs	to	
be	given	to	the	modalities	of	holding	the	non-state	actor	accountable,	individually	
but	also	by	affirming	command	and	control	responsibilities	by	commanders	for	
their	subordinates.	Second,	we	revisit	old	but	important	territory	in	affirming	the	
importance	of	holding	non-state	actors	accountable	under	existing	humanitarian	
law	norms—specifically	Common	Article	3	of	the	Geneva	Conventions	applicable	
to	non-international	armed	conflicts.	Third,	we	encourage	greater	willingness	to	
consider	the	relevance	of	minimum	humanitarian	standards	to	internal	conflicts,	
particularly	if	such	standards	were	to	be	gender-proofed	and	avoid	the	gendered	
gaps	 that	proliferate	 treaty	 standards.	Minimum	standards	might	provide	 some	
buy-in	from	non-state	groupings,	and	there	is	important	precedent	for	such	soft	
law	norms	crystallizing	to	constitute	hard	and	binding	rules.
Finally,	in	the	arena	of	human	rights	obligations	we	argue	that	if	due	diligence	
obligations	 are	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 states	 for	 violence	 against	women	 in	 those	
zones	of	control	ceded	to	the	non-state	actor,	then	legal	and	reputational	costs	to	
states	could	be	made	higher	for	compromises	made	when	negotiating	with	non-
state	actors.	This	might	prompt	the	recalibration	of	interests	in	negotiating	these	
deals	in	the	first	place.	This	could	mean	that	the	reduction	of	public	harms	is	not	
so	readily	traded	for	the	persistence	or	exacerbation	of	a	range	of	private	harms.	
Indeed,	the	credible	threat	of	imputed	state	liability	for	private	harms	perpetrated	
by	 paramilitary	 actors	 could	 mean	 that	 the	 material	 and	 symbolic	 benefits	 of	
inclusion	 (within	 the	 state)	 would,	 in	 a	 meaningful	 way,	 be	 made	 subject	 to	
principles	 of	 non-violence	 and	non-discrimination	 against	women.	 In	 sum,	we	
urge	greater	attention	to	the	non-state	actor	and	greater	attention	to	the	capacity	of	
human	rights	and	humanitarian	law,	as	well	as	transitional	“deals,”	to	hold	such	
actors	accountable	for	gendered	harms	committed	during	armed	conflict.
